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NOTE
The Public Forum Doctrine
and Haig v. Agee
By John E. Bolmer, 11*

Introduction
The winter of 1979 was a tense time for the Department of State.
On November 4, 1979, fifty-two Americans were taken hostage on the
grounds of the American Embassy in Iran.' The Iranian captors had
repeatedly threatened to try the hostages for espionage, and rumors
spread that the Iranians had invited Philip Agee to serve as a juror at
this trial.2 Agee had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
for eleven years before leaving to become one of the Agency's most
outspoken critics.3 In 1974, Agee embarked on a campaign to destroy
the CIA. By 1979, he had released classified government information
in several countries and had endangered the lives of CIA agents overseas by exposing their "covers." 4
The thought that Agee might jeopardize the lives of fifty-two more
Americans may have provided the final push necessary to stir the Secretary of State into action. In December, 1979, Secretary of State
Vance revoked Agee's passport.' Agee was in West Germany at the
time of the revocation 6 and could not go to another country without a
valid passport.7
Agee charged that the Secretary had violated his First Amendment
rights by denying him access to a foreign country, but the Supreme
Court upheld the Secretary's actions in Haig v. Agee.8 The majority's
* B.A., 1980, Claremont Men's College; member, third year class.
I. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 286 n.8 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 283-84.
4. Id. Agee had written: "One way to neutralize the CIA's support to repression is to
expose its officers so that their presence in foreign countries becomes untenable. . . . I will
continue to assist those who are interested in identifying and exposing the CIA people in
their countries." P. AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY 598 (1975).
5. 453 U.S. at 286.
6. Id.
7. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
8. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Between the time of the revocation and the hearing before the
Supreme Court, Secretary Vance had been replaced by Muskie, who himself was replaced
by Haig as Secretary of State.
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holding in Agee-upholding the denial of a passport-is defensible in
view of the special circumstances of the case, but its reasoning potentially extends beyond these circumstances and raises questions about
the power of the Secretary of State in less egregious situations.
This note will review the doctrine of access to public forums as it
applies to domestic speech, and will compare the implications of domestic speech with those of international speech. It will then examine
Agee in order to determine whether a new doctrine of foreign forum
access has emerged and, if so, how the doctrine might affect the future
of overseas travel.
I.

Domestic Forum Denials

One way in which a government can control criticism is to limit
the areas in which "free speech" may occur. Indeed, freedom of speech
would lose much of its potency as a political tool if it did not include
the right to speak to other people at a time and place that "gives [the
speaker] an opportunity to win their attention." 9 Thus, the rights of
free speech and free assembly largely depend upon the peripheral right
to gain access to an appropriate forum.' 0
While access to forums of speech is an important right, the state
often has a conflicting interest in preserving the orderly use of these
areas. The importance of "maintaining public order" led the Supreme
Court in Cox v. Louisiana" to conclude that: "The rights of free
speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still
do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time."' 2 Blind protection
of the individual's right of free speech would certainly prevent a repressive state. But ignoring the state's right to control the use of public
places would lead to disorder and to the "excesses of anarchy"-an
equally distasteful state of affairs."' Cox is a landmark in a series of
cases in which courts have sought to find a proper balance between the
9. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
268 (1968). See also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 49 (1939) (public lands
held in trust as forums for exercise of free speech).
10. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 26 (1965) (Douglas, J, dissenting); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). A peripheral right is one that is necessary for the full enjoyment of some other right.
The current discussion of access to forums necessitates a discussion of the right to
travel. The discussion below will focus on the right to travel insofar as it is a right peripheral
to the exercise of free speech. Consideration of the extent to which this right has its own
basis for support is beyond the scope of this note.
11. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
12. Id. at 554.
13. Id.
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rights of the state and those of the individual.' 4
In Cox, the leader of a civil rights demonstration was arrested for

disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing near a
courthouse. Reverend Cox and about 2000 others marched outside a
Baton Rouge courthouse to protest the recent conviction of other
protesters. The Chief of Police told Cox he could stage the protest on
the far side of the street, but later ordered the group to disperse. When
the group refused to leave, tear gas was used to force them away. The
day after this incident, Cox was arrested for the three alleged violations

of local statutes.' 5

Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, divided the issues in
Cox and delivered two separate opinions.' 6 One reason for the separation might have been that the applicable statutes involved regulation of
access to different forums. Throughout both majority opinions the
state interest in preserving orderly use of a forum was considered in
light of the purpose for which the public area was dedicated. 7
Both the statute limiting protest near a courthouse and the one

barring use of public streets for large gatherings were, at least on their
face, blanket prohibitions on access to these forums. A blanket prohi14. Other cases include: Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
15. The breach of peace statute provided: "Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of
the peace

. . .

crowds or congregates with others

. . .

in or upon

. . .

a public street or

public highway, or upon a public sidewalk . . . and who fails or refuses to disperse...
when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in
which such act or acts are committed,. . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace." LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (West Supp. 1962), reprintedin Cox, 379 U.S. at 544.
The obstruction of public passages charge rested on LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:100.1
(West Supp. 1962), which stated: "No person shall wilfully obstruct the free, convenient and
normal use of any public sidewalk, street ... or other passageway, or the entrance. . . of
any public building ...

by impeding . . . or restraining traffic or passage thereon or

therein." See 379 U.S. at 560.
The third charge against Cox was based on LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:401 (West Supp.
1962), which stated: "Whoever, with the intent of interfering with. . . the administration of
justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the
discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of
Louisiana. . . shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both." See 379 U.S. at 562.
16. Cox v. Louisiana (No. 24), 379 U.S. 536 (1979), dealt with the charges of disturbing
the peace and obstructing public passages. The charge of picketing near a courthouse was
considered in Cox v. Louisiana (No. 49), 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
Three Justices-Black, Clark, and White-wrote separate opinions, concurring in No.
24 and dissenting in No. 49. Justice Harlan joined in the opinion of Justice White. None of
the three authors found it necessary to write two opinions.
17. See, e.g., 379 U.S. at 554-55, 562. Compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(use ofjail grounds forbidden), with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (use of library
approved).
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bition denies all people, regardless of their character or beliefs, access
to a particular forum. Although the Court reversed the convictions obtained under both of these statutes, 8 the opinion made it clear that a
sufficient state interest in the type of activity conducted in a particular
forum would support such blanket prohibitions.' 9
Twenty-six years prior to the Cox decision, in Hague v. Committee
for IndustrialOrganization,20 the Court stated that if access to a forum
were to be offered, it would have to be offered on an equal basis to all
citizens.' The Court has reached this same conclusion at various times
since Hague by considering the proper role of discretion in First
Amendment issues 2 or by analyzing equal protection arguments.' A
string of decisions flowed from the conclusion that access to forums
must be offered equally to all-a string which was woven into a comprehensive doctrine in Cox.
The Court has never spelled out a checklist for determining the
validity of statutes restricting domestic forum access. But the series of
cases in the Cox line indicate that a forum control statute must meet
seven requirements in order to be held valid by the Court: (1) The
statute must regulate some form of conduct and only incidentally affect
"pure speech." The aim of the statute cannot be the suppression of
speech.2 4 (2) The state must have a legitimate interest in controlling the
18. See 379 U.S. at 558, 575.
19. Id. at 562.
20. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21. In Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), Justice Holmes,
writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated: "For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to
forbid it in the house." Id. at 511, 39 N.E. at 113. This notion of legislative power was
echoed in the Supreme Court case which affirmed Commonwealth v. Davis: Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). In the latter case, the Court concluded that the right to lay
blanket prohibitions on forum use "necessarily includes the authority to determine under
what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser."
Id. at 48. Davis represented the prevailing view in the United States until Hague.
22. "This Court has recognized that the lodging of such broad discretion in a public
official allows him to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will
not. This thus sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of ideas ...
"
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556 (1965) (citing Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948));
see also Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-25 (1958).
23. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965); id. at 581 (Black, J.); Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951). See also Kalven, The Concept of the PublicForun:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 29-30.
24. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien has been followed in several
more recent opinions. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 75-76
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Comment, The Riot Curfew, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 450, 473 &
nn.103-04 (1969).
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regulated conduct.2 5 (3) The statute must be narrowly drafted so as to

meet a specific evil within the proper legislative jurisdiction of the state.

Speech may not be unduly burdened by a broad statute. 26 (4) The statute must be drawn clearly so that administrators and applicants for
access permits will not have to guess at its application.27 (5) Administrators may issue permits or licenses with only a limited degree of discretion. 28 (6) The Court would most likely forbid any discretion in the
administering of a license statute based on prior consideration of the

content of the speech.2 9 (7) The statute must be applied consistently.
A.

°

Prior Restraints and Past Actions of the Speaker

The sixth element of the forum denial doctrine suggests that administrative discretion may not be allowed to encompass prior consideration of the content of speech. In other words, the state may not act
as censor. Certain forms of speech may be made illegal, and the state

may punish the speaker if he violates the law, 31 but the Court is not

likely to allow controls
on the content of speech which operate prior to
2
the speech itself.1
25. "[O]ur independent examination of the record. . . shows no conduct which the
State had a right to prohibit as a breach of the peace." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545
(1965). See also Koningsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 125-34 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951); Comment, supra note 24, at 470-71.
26. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938). But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
28. See, e.g., Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941).
29. The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this point. The sixth element would
be consistent with the general opposition to prior restraints and with the implications of
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). For a discussion of prior restraints and the Kunz
case, see infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text. In his concurring opinion in Kunz, Justice Frankfurter suggested that expected content of speech may be an appropriate basis for
permit denial so long as the discretion of the administrator is limited. Id. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra text accompanying note 48. The majority seemed to
reject the Frankfurter proposal, see Kunz, 340 U.S. at 294, but limited its holding to an
invalidation of the statute due to its failure to limit administrative discretion. Id. at 295.
30. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). "Inconsistent application" should be
distinguished from arbitrary use of discretion within the limits of a statute. Inconsistent
application, as used above, refers to a statute that is clear on its face and limits discretion,
but that is invoked arbitrarily. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 557-58 (authorities in
their discretion permitted parades in apparent violation of clear statute).
31. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words).
32. See supra note 29.
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If the utterance of certain statements may be made illegal because
of their potentially harmful effects on the community, it might seem
logical to allow authorities to prevent the release of such statements in
the first place. The speaker would be spared criminal charges and the
public would be saved from the expected harm. Yet prior restraints on
speech have been assailed as evil since the time of William
Blackstone.3 3

A system of prior restraints is inherently dangerous.3 4 Prior restraints must be justified by predictions and judgments. There must be
a prediction as to the content of the speech and a judgment that this
content will be beyond the protections of the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court will not allow judicial restraints based on "surmise or

conjecture that untoward consequences may result." 35 When the system is carried beyond the courts, the hazards to free speech can only be
increased.3 6
The potential benefit of prior restraints, as mentioned above, lies
in the protection of the public from harm caused by release of unprotected speech. One danger in such a practice is that it may mistakenly
prevent the release of protected speech. This danger flows in part from
the procedures often used in administrative exercise of the restraints.
"[T]he procedural protections built around the criminal prosecution
. . . are not applicable to a prior restraint. The presumption of innocence, the heavier burden of proof borne by the government, the
stricter rules of evidence, . . .- all these are not on the side of free
expression when its fate is decided."37 Errors caused by these procedures can be corrected if the administrator's decision is appealed. But
the delay caused by an appeal has serious ramifications on free speech
as well.38
The Court has made a few exceptions to the general rule prohibiting prior restraints. For example, the harm that might flow from the
33. Blackstone stated: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature ofa free
state; but this consists in laying noprevious restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure

. . .

when published ....

" 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52,

quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
34. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,
656-60 (1955).
35. New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 725-26
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. "Perhaps the most significant feature of systems of prior restraint is that they contain within themselves forces which drive irresistibly toward unintelligent, overzealous, and
usually absurd administration. . . . [C]ommon experience is sufficient to show that [licensers' and censors'] attitudes, drives, emotions, and impulses all tend to carry them to excesses." Emerson, supra note 34, at 658.
37. Id. at 657.
38. Id.
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release of obscenity39 or from the distribution of information compromising the safety of American troops40 might justify the burdens imposed by a system of prior restraints.
It has been argued that prior restraints on forum access should be
allowed when based on a reasonable expectation of violence gained by
observation of the past actions of the speaker. 4 1 This argument assumes that past acts (particularly past speeches) would provide a clear
basis for the prediction of the content of future speech. Thus, the risk
of arbitrary or erroneous administrative enforcement of the restraining
power could be lessened. In his concurring opinion in Kunz v. New
York, 42 Justice Frankfurter proposed that a speaker's past acts be examined when determining his eligibility for a license granting access to
a controlled forum. The majority in Kunz did not adopt this proposal.
In Kunz, a local ordinance allowed revocation or denial of a permit to assemble after a hearing to determine whether the "privilege" to
speak had been abused. Kunz's permit had been revoked and his apthat his "reliplication for a new permit denied after evidence showed
43
gious meetings had in the past caused some disorder.
The majority in Kunz held that the statute created an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.' The Court conceded that the state
could punish Kunz for his past abuses, but argued that the proper concern of the Court in forum denial cases is "with suppression-not
punishment. 4 5
Kunz did not completely settle the issue of the appropriateness of
using past conduct in the consideration of forum permits. Since the
statute at issue was vague and required the Commissioner to guess at
what conduct was condemned, 46 the Court, in holding the statute invalid, based its conclusion on the vagueness finding alone.4 7 Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the result, but stated that he would allow refusals of permits based on past conduct if the guidelines for this refusal
were limited:
[T]he license was refused because the police commissioner
thought it likely. . . that Kunz would outrage the religious sensi39. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
40. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
41. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295, 303, 312-13 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 273 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. 340 U.S. at 294.
44. Id. at 293.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. ("[T]here is no mention in the ordinance of reasons for which [a] permit application can be refused. This interpretation allows the police commissioner, an administrative
official, to exercise discretion [on] the basis of his interpretation, at that time, of what is
deemed to be conduct condemned by the ordinance.")
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bilities of others. Ifsuch had been the supportablefinding on the
basis ffair standardsin safeguardingpeace... [we] would not
But here the standards are [not
be justified in upsetting it ....
so narrow as] to preclude discriminatory or arbitrary action by
officials."8
Frankfurter would view a limited permit denial or revocation statute as
a proper consequence of past acts rather than as a means of censoring
future speech.4 9
Justice Frankfurter did not delineate the standards he would require for a valid license restriction. He did emphasize, however, that
he was concerned with the potential for arbitrary administrative action.
Consequently, in determining the validity of a statute restricting license
availability, it would seem reasonable to demand, as a threshold requirement, that administrative consideration be limited to only those
past acts that would be punishable. Indeed, Kunz's license was not
revoked because his past speech was merely unpopular, his past speech
was illegal.50
B.

Summary

A domestic forum may be denied pursuant to a statute that: (1) is
primarily a regulation of conduct; (2) reflects a legitimate state interest;
(3) is narrowly drawn; (4) is clear as to its application; (5) allows only
limited administrative discretion; (6) does not involve discretion based
on the expected content of speech (prior restraint); and (7) is applied
consistently. 5 I The extent to which past conduct of the applicant may
be used to determine eligibility is unclear.
II.

Foreign and Domestic Forums Compared

Determination of the extent of the right to forum access requires a
balance between the interests of the individual in free speech and the
interests of the state. In the domestic setting, the state interests usually
consist of preserving the orderly and intended use of the forum, or of
protecting the community. A balancing process is also employed in the
foreign setting, but the interests weighed in that balance differ from
those in a domestic case. These differences may explain the dissimilar
results of the balancing process in the two geographic settings. They
48. Id. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Frankfurter's concurrence also covers Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), and Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951), and appears before the majority opinion in Kunz.
49. 340 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. Kunz violated a New York City ordinance that prohibited ridiculing or denouncing
"other religious beliefs." 340 U.S. at 292.
51. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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also suggest that an analogy between foreign and domestic forum access is not perfect.
In the analysis of governmental interests in questions involving access to international forums, orderly use of the forums themselves is no
longer a factor. 2 Instead, consideration is made of the interest in conducting foreign policy5 3 and in preserving the government's ability to
gather information overseas. 4 The most important concerns, however,
are probably the interests in the protection of national security (which
may be threatened by agitation and conspiracies abroad) and the security of nationals (including both the speaker and those who might be
affected by his words).5
The governmental interests in restricting access to foreign forums
are potentially great. As the Iranian crisis so well indicated, the ability
of the United States government to protect those interests is more lim56
ited than if the same problems were to arise in a domestic incident.
These factors necessitate reexamination of the weight of the governmental arguments favoring restrictions on forum access.
The individual's interest in access to foreign forums involves his
enjoyment of free speech. This raises an important question: Are First
Amendment rights overseas protected to the same extent as they are
within the United States? This question was specifically avoided by
Chief Justice Burger in Haig v. Agee. 57 Nevertheless, we can gain some
insight into the likely answer by looking at the reasons forwarded for
free forum access and applying them to the two arenas.
Some have belittled the differences between the benefits of international and interstate travel: "Nor is there any reason to differentiate
among intracity, interstate, and extranational travel in terms of the individual's interests which inhere in his ability to move about
freely. . . . The abilities . . . to gather and disseminate information
. . .are. . . fundamental values dependent upon freedom of intracity,
interstate, and extranational movement alike. 5' 8 And yet there are differences in the expectations of travelers in the two settings.
Access to domestic forums is necessary for the effective distribu52. Agee might mark an exception to this proposition. Since Agee's speech was to occur
at an American embassy, the government did have an interest in protecting its citizens' use
of that forum for the functions primarily intended.
53. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 282, 307 (1981); 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1982).
54. See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 308; Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
55. See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 308 (imminent threat to nonspeaker abroad); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (threat to speaker and nonspeakers in U.S.); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (delayed threat to nonspeakers in U.S.).
56. The American hostages were held for a total of 444 days. An attempt to rescue
them by force on April 24, 1980 failed.
57. 453 U.S. at 308.
58. Comment, supra note 24, at 470.
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tion of information deemed essential to our democratic system.5 9 It
might be argued that access to foreign forums is important only for the
collection of information. 60 Thus, there is less need to protect access to
foreign forums so long as there are reasonable means of acquiring the
information and, more importantly, an alternative domestic forum
available to the speaker.6 ' But this argument ignores the importance of
the foreign forum for distribution of information. Justice Fortas has
suggested that an essential consideration in forum denial cases is:
"Were there facilities available for the protest which were reasonably
adequate to serve the lawful purposes of the protesters ... ?-62 Over-

seas speech may attract special domestic attention.63 The showcase
provided by the international exposure of issues may make a domestic
forum a less effective alternative. Denials of effective forums may have
serious long-range implications for the welfare of the nation.'
It is important to recall that the Court inAgee declined to address
the question of whether the First Amendment protects freedom of
speech overseas.65 Thus, while the Court may choose, as a matter of
policy, to give the same strict protection to speech abroad as it gives to
domestic speech, it may not be bound by precedent to do so.
It is unclear whether the Court views the individual's right to foreign forums less favorably than it views his right to domestic forums, or
whether the Court has rebalanced the interests involved with a stronger
emphasis on the governmental interest in controlling international
travel and speech. What is clear is the fact that greater restrictions have
been allowed on foreign travel than on domestic movement. The passport is an apt symbol of this difference: Few people question the right
of Congress to require a passport for foreign travel, but such a "permit"
59. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.

60. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE,

THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION

195-97 (1968);

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
61. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 268; Groll, Clash of Forces, in THE LAW OF
DISSENT AND RIOTS 109, 115 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1969).

62. A. FORTAS,

CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

32 (1968) (emphasis

in original).
63. This has been demonstrated by the recent travels of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. See Will, Again the Fact Finders, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 80.
64. For example, criticism from one whose travels are restricted "may in the long run be
more damaging because of the very fact that the critic may describe himself as a prisoner
within the borders of the nation that professes adherence to the principles of freedom."
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 44 (1958)
(report of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM TO TRAVEL]. Denial of effective forums may also cause an increase in domestic violence. The ability to control terrorism and rioting rests in part on the "underlying
assumption ... that it is possible to focus society's attention ... upon a [sic] issue through

lawful means." Groll, supra note 61 at 115.
65. See 453 U.S. at 308.
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requirement would be unthinkable within the United States.66
How has the Court's rebalancing affected the applicability of the
domestic forum denial doctrine to foreign forum denial cases? The discussion below will seek an answer to this question by looking at the
string of passport cases culminating in Haig v. Agee. Before we begin
this discussion, however, it will be helpful to gain some knowledge of
the passport's significance.
III. Early Passport Cases
A passport is a "travel document issued under the authority of the
Secretary of State attesting to the identity and nationality of the
bearer."67 Passports have always been required of United States citizens traveling during times of war,68 but were not commonplace in
peacetime travel until the middle of the twentieth century.69
The first major restriction on peacetime travel overseas came in
1952, when Congress made it illegal to leave or enter the United States
without a valid passport. 0 Today, several statutes deal with the acquisition and use of passports.7 '
The passport existed long before it was considered essential. Consequently, it has sometimes been referred to as a privileged
72 grant-one
which is discretionary on the part of the government. Of course, the
fact that it is discretionary does not answer the deeper question of how
that discretion may be exercised.
The Court has supported the categorization of a passport as a privilege by noting that the document itself is the property of the government.73 This implies that the government maintains some control over
the document even in the hands of the traveler. Some of the Court's
decisions have stressed this property aspect at the expense of a consideration of the document's practical effects. This focus has allowed the
Court to support restrictions on travel with apassport while condemning restrictions on the right to travel itself.74 But the logic of this distinction is questionable in light of the present nature of the passport.
66. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 775.
67. 22 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1982).
68. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES PASSPORT: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
181 (1976).
69. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 33 (1964), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965). See
also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 60, at 176-93.
70. Act of June 27, 1952, § 215, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
71. Eg., 22 U.S.C. § 21 Ia (1976). See also 22 C.F.R. §§ 50-53 (1982).
72. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124 (1958).
73. See, e.g., Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 22 C.F.R. § 51.9 (1982);
III G. HACKWORTH, DIOEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 437-39 (1942).
74. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d at 947; Comment, supra note 24, at 469-73.
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Before the passport was commonly used in travel, the difference
between the right to travel and the right to travel with apassport may
have had a logical basis. Today, the practical distinctions are minimal.15 The denial or revocation
of a passport is "in effect a prohibi76
tion" against travel abroad.

The Court still views the granting of a passport as a discretionary
act. But the realization that the exercise of this discretion inexorably
affects liberty interests in travel has led the Court to examine this exercise under the rigors of "due process."' 77 The Fifth Amendment demands that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."'78 The Court has interpreted this clause to
mean that liberty interests may not be restricted without (a) a sufficient
state interest in the restriction, 79 and (b) safeguards to insure "fair" application of the restriction. 0
The first significant Supreme Court decision dealing with a passport denial was Kent v. Dulles.8 I Kent was associated with Communist
organizations. His passport was denied on the strength of a State Department regulation limiting various activities of Communists and
those involved in Communist Party campaigns.8 2 Kent was given the
opportunity to fight the denial at a hearing, but "as a matter of conscience" refused to supply the necessary affidavits concerning his Communist affiliations.8 3
The Court in Kent did not reach the issue of the constitutionality
of the restrictions. Instead, it held that the Secretary of State's regulations in this case were not supported by a sufficient congressional delegation of authority. 4 Even though the constitutional issues were never
reached in Kent, its dictum has been relied upon in subsequent analy75. "Most countries will admit no one without a passport issued by some government; a
survey conducted in 1952 revealed that of 37 countries studied, only 5 would admit a traveler without a passport." Mittlebeeler, Freedomto TravelAbroad,in CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLICY AND POLICY MAKING 139, 145 (S. Wasby ed. 1976).
76. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964).
77. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (dictum).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This same language is applied to the states in U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
79. Substantive due process asks whether any restriction is justified. Most laws will
meet this test under the present standard. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437
U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978).
80. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Considerations of the Court
included "the probable value. . . of additional or substitute safeguards: and. . . the government's interest, including . . . fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail." Id. at 335.
81. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
82. Id. at 117-18.
83. Id. at 119.
84. Id. at 129.
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ses of passport restrictions.8 5
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Kent, echoed the
views of Professor Zechariah Chafee that freedom of travel "has large
social values." 6 Recognition of the importance of world travel led
Douglas to declare that "[t]he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process . .".8.
This was the first formal indication that international travel was a protected interest of American citizens.
The practical effect of denial of a passport is to deny access to a
foreign forum. 8 Just as Kunz was required to obtain a license before
he could gain access to a domestic forum,89 so the overseas traveler
must obtain a passport before she can gain access to a foreign forum.
We have seen how the Court has kept a close watch over license requirement procedures used to deny access to domestic forums. Thus, it
seems reasonable to expect the Court to be concerned with procedures
restricting the issuance of passports, since passports are, in effect,
"licenses" to use foreign forums.
The Court in Kent invalidated the Secretary's passport denial because of the basis for that denial-the applicant's "refusal to be subjected to inquiry" into his political beliefs and associations.9" The
ruling did not discuss the due process implications of this inquiry, but
the majority opinion made clear that denials based on beliefs or associations would be overruled if the opportunity to do so were to
arise.9 '
The next major Supreme Court passport decision was Aptheker v.
Secretaryof State.92 This case also arose out of the Secretary's decision
to deny a passport to a Communist Party member. Aptheker can be
distinguished from Kent, however, because the Secretary of State's de93
nial was made pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority.
Also, the Secretary's discretion inAptheker was far more limited than it
was in Kent. In Aptheker, he could not grant a passport to any Communist Party member, but he had no authority to deny a passport on
other political activity grounds.
85. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
86. 357 U.S. at 126-27 (citing Z. CHAFEE, supra note 60, at 195-97).
87. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
88. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
89. See supra text accompanying note 43.
90. 357 U.S. at 130.
91. Id. at 124-25.
92. 378 U.S. 500 (1963).
93. The Court declared unconstitutional § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1977). The statute forbade the use of passports by members of registered Communist organizations.
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The Court in Aptheker agreed that the statute was a clear delegation of power to the Secretary and that it gave him less leeway than did
the Kent statute. Nevertheless, the Court struck down the statute on
the ground that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.14 Although the
government is justified in acting to prevent the adverse effects of international travel by Communists conspiring to do violence against the
nation, this statute restricted the right of all Communist Party members
to travel, and therefore burdened the exercise of rights by those members who lacked the mens rea of conspiracy. Thus, the statute in
Aptheker can be compared to one examined years later in Cox v. Louisiana: It "sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected."9 5 Because of this flaw, the Court held both statutes
unconstitutional.
Third in the line of passport cases is Zemel v. Rusk. 96 The applicant in Zemel was denied a passport to Cuba. The President and the
Secretary of State had declared Cuba a travel-restricted area after the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.17 This was, in effect, a blanket restriction
of access, involving no consideration of the applicant himself. The
Court upheld the denial and the statute on which it was based.98 Zemel argued that his First Amendment rights had been violated-specifically, his alleged right to gather information. But the
Court held the restriction valid after determining that it was a control
of action (presumably the act of traveling), not a control of speech. 99
Foreign travel provides important opportunities for access to forums of speech and information gathering. These characteristics make
travel a liberty interest which cannot lightly be abridged. The Court in
Zemel reemphasized the importance of this liberty interest. This does
not mean, however, that freedom of international travel is an absolute
right. Rather, it may be restricted if the demands of due process are
satisfied.
Due process requires consideration of the characteristics of any restrictions on protected interests."° The Court found that the procedures by which Zemel was denied his liberty to travel to Cuba were
reasonable. Unlike the regulations in Kent and Aptheker, the statute
authorizing the Secretary's actions in Zemel did not allow discrimina94. 378 U.S. at 512-14. For a discussion of the distinction between vagueness and overbreadth, see Sperber & Solomon, Preservingthe Peace: Vagueness, Overbreadth and Free
Speech, 3 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 161, 163-66 (1966).
95. 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965).
96. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 14.
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tion between applicants on the basis of beliefs or associations. 10 1
There are many similarities between the analysis used in the three
passport cases and that used in the domestic access cases. In Cox, the
Court declared blanket domestic forum denials permissible if the rea-

sons for denial were sufficient to outweigh any interests of the individ-

ual.102 Zemel reaffirmed general approval of blanket forum denials and
judgment in the determiattached greater weight to the administrator's
10 3
nation of the need for the restriction.
Furthermore, even though the analogy between domestic and for-

eign forum access is not perfect, at least some of the required elements
for valid discretionary domestic forum denials' °4 appear in the passport
cases as well. Zemel emphasized that the denials operated on action
and only peripherally restricted speech (domestic element one); all

three cases stressed the strong foreign policy and security interests of
the government (domestic element two); and Aptheker squarely addressed the need for a narrow statute (domestic element three). Kent

emphasized the need for specific grants of authority in each instance,
since the Court "will not readily infer" delegation to the Secretary of
"unbridled discretion" to limit constitutionally protected liberty inter05
ests (domestic elements four and five).1
The applicability of the sixth element of the forum denial doctrine

is uncertain in the foreign setting. Domestic element six prohibits prior
examination of the content of proposed speech from being used as the

basis for discretionary forum access decisions. The passport cases indi101. Id. at 13. Zemel also argued that the administration was given too much discretion
in the determination of "off limits" areas. The standards used to determine the need for
blanket controls allegedly were not sufficiently definite. The Court agreed that the applicable guidelines were loosely worded, but held that "Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than
that it customarily wields in domestic areas." Id. at 17. This conclusion was based in part
on a consideration of the inherent powers of the Executive, see United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and on the enhanced ability of the Executive to
acquire the information necessary for a quick decision. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17.
The Court in Zemel gave great deference to the judgment of the State Department that
Cuba was a dangerous area. Indeed, only a cursory examination of the facts preceded the
holding that the Secretary's conclusion was justified. Id. at 14-15. In view of the attention
received by the situation in Cuba, extensive discussion may have been considered unnecessary by the Court. Furthermore, one of the "facts" considered relevant to this holding was
the "judgment of the State Department" as to the goals of the Castro regime. Id. at 14. It
thus seems the Court was reluctant to second-guess the Secretary as to which area quarantines were necessary for the protection of the general public.
102. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
103. The rules for blanket forum denials in the two settings thus seem quite similar. But
the factors balanced to reach those rules are not directly comparable. See supra notes 52-66
and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
105. 357 U.S. at 129.
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cate that denials may not be based on mere beliefs or associations. But
inAptheker the Court struck down the statute because it burdened protected forms of speech as well as conspiracy and incitement. This implies that the Court would uphold a sufficiently narrow statute that
screened only unprotected future speech. Any such screening decision
would have to be based on (a) admissions of intention by the speaker;
(b) examination of the speaker's past activities (in order to predict the
nature of his speech from his character); or (c) examination of the text
of the proposed address itself. However, this screening would be unlikely to pass Court scrutiny, for it is a form of prior restraint based on
the expected content of speech,
which apparently has been condemned
10 6
in domestic forum cases.

IV. Haig v. Agee
The fourth major passport decision was the recent case of Haig v.
Agee. °7 Agee sued the Secretary of State for declaratory and injunctive relief from the passport denial. He was granted summary judgment in federal district court on the ground that the Passport Act of
1926, l08 which authorized the President to set rules for the issuance of
passports, did not authorize rules for the revocation of passports."0 9
This holding was affirmed in the court of appeals."" Neither of the
lower courts reached the constitutional issues involved in the Supreme
Court's decision.
It is important at this stage to mention the issues that were not
argued before the Supreme Court. Most significant is the factual issue
of whether Agee fell within the terms of the regulation. The regulation
relied upon by the Secretary called for the refusal of a passport to anyone who was "causing or. . .likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States.""' Since
Agee challenged this statute on its face, he admitted for purposes of
summary judgment that he fell within its terms. Agee also conceded
that the power to deny a passport implied the power to revoke one.
106. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
107. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Some facts of this case have been discussed above, see supra
text accompanying notes 1-8, but other aspects of the case should be noted. While Agee's
proposed trip to Iran may have been the immediate cause of the revocation, the stated purpose of Secretary Vance's action was to prevent harm to American interests in all countries.
Secretary Vance's successors (Secretaries Muskie and Haig) both refused to reissue the passport. Consequently, Agee's case was not made moot by the return of the hostages from Iran.
108. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) (the language has not changed since 1926). See Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. at 290.
109. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.C. 1980).
110. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
111. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1982).
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Agee attacked the regulation on the grounds that it was vague,

overbroad, unduly restrictive of his Fifth Amendment right of travel,
and overly burdensome of his freedom to criticize government policies." 2 All of these arguments were rejected by the majority.
Agee's claims of vagueness and overbreadth were dismissed in a

footnote of the majority opinion. 113 Agee had conceded that he posed
a "serious danger" to the safety or policies of the United States in order

to proceed with his motion for summary judgment. The Court held
that this concession denied him standing to argue the vagueness or

overbreadth of the statute.'

'4

The regulation upheld in Agee permitted denial or revocation of

an individual's passport if he were deemed likely to cause "serious
damage" to the "national security" or "foreign policy" of the United
States." 5 The Court stated that "the government's interpretation of the

terms 'serious damage' and 'national security' shows a proper regard
,,.
6 The Court might also have quesfor constitutional rights .
tioned whether another arguably vague term-"foreign policy"-had

been adequately interpreted. The State Department may in fact have
shown "proper regard for constitutional rights" in its interpretation of
these words. But unbridled power to interpret these terms could give

the administrator undesirably broad discretion in the issuance of passports. A fair reading of any of the three terms here discussed shows

that they could encompass a vast array of circumstances.' '7 Agee's argument that the regulation carries with it the power to exercise impermissible discretion does not seem adequately rebutted by a finding that
this power has not yet been abused.'' 8
112. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 287. Agee also charged: (1) that Congress had not authorized the regulation; and (2) that failure to provide a prerevocation hearing violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id.
The Court held that 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4), which had been invoked by the Secretary,
had been authorized by Congress. A full discussion of the Court's analysis of this issue is
beyond the scope of this note. It might be mentioned in passing, however, that the Court in
Agee was much more willing to find a congressional grant of power than was the Court in
Kent. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 312-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The due process
argument was also rejected.
113. 453 U.S. at 309 n.61.
114. Justice Brennan attacked this holding in his dissent. .d. at 320-21 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
115. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1982).
116. 453 U.S. at 309 n.61.
117. "[The] word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
"[T]he term 'national security' has no fixed content. .. ." FREEDOM TO TRAVEL, supra
note 64, at 59. The authors of the preceding quotation do offer their "understanding" of the
term. Id.
118. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The Court also rejected Agee's claim of interference with his right
to travel. In discussing this claim, the majority lifted a scale with liberty of travel on one side and national security on the other. The Court
concluded that there is no right to international travel merely for the
sake of travel comparable to the right of interstate travel. Thus, international travel may be restricted by reasonable measures. If Agee had,
in fact, merely asserted the right to travel for its own sake, it would be
difficult to contradict the Court's conclusion. 1 9 But travel is also important as a means of exercising free speech. The Court's conclusion
affects this exercise and reflects a new shift in the balance towards the
interests of the government.
A passport is, in effect, a license for access to a foreign forum. 20
Recognition of the passport's importance led the Court in Kent to require passport revocations to meet with the standards of due process.
The majority in Agee claimed to accept Kent's due process dictum, but
went on to state that "the freedom to travel abroad with a 'letter of
introduction' in the form of a passport issued by the sovereign is
subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as
such, it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation."' 2 ' "Letter of
introduction" implies that the applicant must maintain a good character or must otherwise do something to merit receipt of the document.
In contrast, the view that a passport is a key to the enjoyment of a
liberty interest implies that the holder must do something to merit revocation of the document. In the latter case, the passport holder or applicant has a presumptive right to the document. Scholars agree that the
passport serves a limited function as a letter of introduction in certain
cases, 2' but its main function is as a23voucher of citizenship and identity-not as a voucher of character.
The Court's use of the expression "letter of introduction" reemphasizes the discretionary nature of the document. The majority recognizes the effects of passport denial on travel, but then ignores this factor
as though it were irrelevant to its decision. The important governmental interests are weighed against the privilege of obtaining a govern119. This topic is beyond the scope of this note. See supra note 10.
120. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
121. 453 U.S. at 306.

122. Cf. 22 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1982) (special types of passports).
123. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis notes that the theory that issuance of a passport is a
privilege may once have been valid. "[P]assports were for more than a century nothing but
requests to other governments for safe and free passage for the holders. . . ." This theory
"became unreal as the nature of a passport changed." Davis, The Requirement of a TrialType Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193, 259-60 (1956), reprintedin STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
CONST. RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE RIGHT

TO TRAVEL AND UNITED STATES PASSPORT POLICIES 29, 95-96 (Comm. Print 1958). See

also 22 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1982) (definition of passport).
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ment "sponsorship" of travel. 124 Cast in this light, the results of the
balancing process are predictable.
Justice Brennan sought to regain the proper balance in his dissent.
[R]evocation of [Agee's] passport obviously does implicate First
Amendment rights by chilling his right to speak, and therefore
the Court's responsibility must be to balance that infringement
against the asserted governmental interests to determine
whether
125
the revocation contravenes the First Amendment.
By failing to consider the implications of revocation on Agee's First
Amendment rights, the majority struck a balance without weighing all
of the consequences.
By analyzing the nebulous right to travel in a conceptual vacuum,
the majority overlooked the effects of travel restrictions on forum access. The majority went so far as to say that the revocation does not
inhibit speech because "Agee is as free to criticize the United States
Government as he was when he held a passport."'126 Justice Brennan
ridicules this statement in his dissent.
Under the Court's rationale, I would suppose that a 40-year
prison sentence imposed upon a person who criticized the Government's food stamp policy would represent only an "inhibition
of action." After all, the individual would remain free to criticize
the United States Government, albeit from a jail cell.' 2 7
This flaw in the majority argument, and the separation of the right to
travel analysis from the First Amendment analysis suggest that forum
denial issues were not seriously considered by the majority.
The Court turned next to a brief exploration of Agee's First
Amendment arguments. Its summary treatment of complex issues in
this area makes this section of the opinion somewhat confusing. The
majority characterized the passport revocation as an inhibition of action "rather" than speech. But, as noted in Justice Brennan's dissent,
the revocation was an inhibition of action as well as speech. Had the
inhibition of Agee's speech been an incidental result of an impartial
control of conduct, support of this action might have fit into the mainstream of previous forum denial cases. But inhibition of speech is not
an incidental effect of this revocation-it is the underlying goal of the
restriction. This factor distinguishes Agee's situation from that in
Zemel and similar cases.
124. See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 309. In Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill.
2d 605,
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978), the court held that the City of Skokie, Illinois, had to allow parades in
which Nazi uniforms were worn. We would not expect to hear that, by issuing a license for
such a parade, the city had "sponsored" the event.
125. Agee, 453 U.S. at 320 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. 453 U.S. at 309.
127. Id. at 320 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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One other fact distinguishes the Agee case from prior cases where
discretionary forum denials have occurred. It was the past conduct,
character, and expected future conduct of Agee that triggered the revoThis being so, the revocation constituted a prior restraint on
cation. 28
speech.'
Under the general doctrine of prior restraint, the government must
allow the speech or publication to take place before bringing an action
against the speaker. Near v. Minnesota,'29 however, provides for exceptions to this rule, and the majority in Agee tries to avoid the prior restraints attack by 30claiming that Agee's speech falls within one of the
Near exceptions.'
In Near, the Court held impermissible a prepublication restraint
on what was expected to be libelous material. But a statement by the
majority suggested that prior restraints would be allowed in certain
situations:
[N]o one would question but that a government might prevent
actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops. On similar grounds. . . [t]he security of the community
life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and
the overthrow by force of orderly government. 3 '
This troop-safety example has become known as the Near exception.
The limits of the Near exception were tested by the government in
two important cases: New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon
Papers),3 2 and United States v. Progressive,Inc."' None of the plurality opinions in the Pentagon Papers case commanded more than two
votes, and these opinions expressed differing views as to the appropriate standard for application of the Near exception.' 3 4 The federal district court in Progressive, Inc. adopted the test proposed by Justices
direct, immediWhite and Marshall and required a showing of "grave,
3
ate and irreparable harm to the United States." '1
The majority inAgee felt that the Near exception, as amended by
the PentagonPapers-Progressivetest applied. But inAgee, there was no
real proof of harm. Agee admittedforpurposes of summaryjudgment
that his conduct would fall within the regulation. "Therefore, until the
facts are known, the majority. . . can have [no] idea whether Agee's
128. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
129. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
130. Agee, 453 U.S. at 308.
131. 283 U.S. at 716.
132. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
133. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
134. See generally, Note, Open Secrets: Protecting the Identity of the CI4s Intelligence
Gatherers in a FirstAmendment Society, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1723, 1730 (1981).
135. Progressive,Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 996.
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conduct actually would fall within the extreme factual category
presented by Near."136 In the Pentagon Papers and Progressive cases,
proof of the eventual harm was provided by examination of the exact
material to be released. No such proof was available in Agee.
The Court's statement that "[t]he revocation of Agee's passport
rests in part on the content of his speech: specifically, his repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of intelligence personnel,"' 37 is inaccurate. The statement should read: "The revocation of
Agee's passport rests in part on the expected content of his speech
. - - " This expectation must be deduced by an examination of Agee's

past speeches.
The Agee decision held that passport revocations may be based on
the content of speech. This conclusion by itself is not extraordinary in
view of the long-established Near exception and the concession by
Agee for purposes of summary judgment that he was "likely to cause
serious damage" to national security. What is extraordinary about this
case is that the Court also allows restrictions based on content when the
specific content is not known. In addition, the Court indicates that administrators may form the expectation of content by looking to the past
acts and speeches of the speaker. These factors distinguish Agee from
other cases that have applied the Near exception.
V.

Applicability of the Domestic Doctrine Abroad

What portions of the domestic forum denial doctrine still apply to
foreign forums after Haig v. Agee? Since the State Department regulates conduct (travel with a passport), and since it has a valid state interest in regulating this conduct, elements one and two of the sevenstep doctrine may be said to apply in the foreign forum arena.138 Elements three and four call for narrow statutes that clearly describe the
situations under which they will apply. 139 These requirements were
followed in Kent and Zemel, and the Court in Agee at least purported
to follow these principles. But afterAgee, the standards of narrowness
and clarity in the authorizing statute will probably be less stringently
applied to passport regulations. Element seven, calling for consistent
application of a statute, 40 has not been a major factor in any of the
passport decisions.
In part, then, the doctrine expounded in Cox is transferable to the
foreign forum setting. But Agee leaves serious doubts as to the applicability of elements five and six. Element five demands that discretion in
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

453 U.S. at 321 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
453 U.S. at 308.
See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
See supra text accompanying note 30.
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administration of the statute be limited.' 4 ' Element six forbids prior
examination of the content of the speech. 142 Agee allows restrictions
based on content and, as noted above, conflict between this fact and the
dictates of the domestic forum denial doctrine cannot adequately be
resolved by reference to the Near exception.' 43 Furthermore, the Court
will allow the Secretary of State to infer the content of speech from the
past speech and conduct of the applicant, at least when the applicant
admits that the intended speech will have the forbidden harmful effects. This implies that a potentially vast reservoir of discretionary
power has been provided for the administrator. If so, a significant gulf
has been opened between the rules for foreign and domestic forum
access.
VI.

Alternative Holdings

Critique of a case requires inquiry into the alternatives not chosen
by the court. This section will examine various alternative holdings in
a case such asAgee. At all times, certain policy goals should be kept in
mind: (1) All viable alternatives should result in the least possible interference with access to a forum for free speech; (2) no alternative
should cripple the government's ability to respond to a crisis situation;
and (3) potential for administrative abuse of any rule should be
minimized.
One problem with the Agee decision is the majority's failure to
establish guidelines for the Secretary's exercise of discretion. The case
allows him great flexibility in determining which speech should be subjected to prior restraint. Prior restraint can be a damaging tool in the
hands of an overbearing administrator. Administrative action may result in only minor delay in forum access (at least where there is a possibility of prompt appeal), but at times even a short delay may be all that
is needed to thwart the effectiveness of the speaker." 4 And often the
mere presence of a restraining power will deter the full use of the right
to free speech. 4 5 One option available to the Court would have been
to uphold the Secretary's exercise of discretion in this case, while imposing strictures on later exercises of power.
The dissent in Agee argued that the Near exception was inapplicable because the Secretary was required to guess at both the content and
the consequences of future speech. One of the reasons Agee's speech
was expected to cause harm was the fact that he had special knowledge
141. See supra text accompanying note 28.
142. See supra text accompanying note 29.
143. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
144. See Emerson, supra note 34, at 657; Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80
L. REv. 1773, 1787 (1967).
145. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
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of classified information-information presumed to be harmful if released generally. The Court could have limited the Secretary's discretion while upholding his actions by setting out a "CIA exception." In
the majority of cases, travelers abroad will not have knowledge of confidential information. Nor will they have information that would meet
the Pentagon Papers-Progressivestandard for the imposition of a prior
restraint. This standard calls for proof of grave, direct, immediate, and
irreparable harm.146 We have already seen how disclosures by CIA or
former CIA agents might be presumptively harmful. The Court might
allow a presumption of the content of the speech to arise upon proof
that the speaker had previously violated the terms of his contract with
the CIA.
It might be argued that these "CIA exception" presumptions
would impose unconstitutional burdens on the First Amendment rights
of CIA agents. Such an exception might also be challenged on equal
protection grounds, since it would apply only to agents and former
agents. But similar arguments have been rejected in recent cases.' 47
CIA agents must sign an agreement with the government before they
obtain their positions. This agreement prohibits agents and former
agents from revealing "any classified information, or any information
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA
...without the express written consent of the Director."' 48 Courts
have enforced this agreement in various contexts' 49 and have developed the doctrine of "contractual prior restraints." 5 0 Therefore, precedent seems to exist in support of a CIA exception to passport
revocations based on past conduct and future expectations.
The holding inAgee permits the State Department to invoke prior
restraints in exceptional situations. This power is potentially harmful
to the interests of the individual, because most systems of prior restraint "contain within themselves forces which drive irresistably toward unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd administration." 5 I
The fact that the administrator determines the existence of an exceptional situation only amplifies the dangers inherent in this system.
In Freedman v. Maryland,'5 2 the Court discussed the need for
quick judicial review in censorship cases. 5 3 The reasons for this con146. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
147. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
148. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. at 508 & n. I.
149. See, e.g., id. (damages for government after release of nonclassified information);
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1309 (prior review of classified information).
150. See generally Note, supra note 134.
151. Emerson, supra note 34, at 658.
152. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
153. Id. at 59.
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clusion are the same as those that lead to a conclusion that postrevocation hearings in forum access cases may be meaningless. The majority
inAgee held that due process does not require a prerevocation hearing
in passport cases. But an alternative safeguard of individual rights was
not discussed. In urgent situations, an ex parte proceeding (similar to
the procedures used to obtain a search warrant) might be beneficial.
Such a proceeding would allow ajudge to determine the need for prior
restraint, while protecting the governmental interest in the ability to
react swiftly to perceived national security threats. Although the proceeding would not reduce the impact of a prior restraint upon those
whose passports were indeed revoked, it would limit application of this
restriction to those who, in the eyes of an impartial observer, present a
probable danger to the nation.
The use of an ex parte proceeding would greatly reduce the potential for administrative abuse of the power to restrict passports. An exception, such as the CIA exception proposed above, would narrow the
initial bases for administrative discretion. Neither alternative would
change the result in Agee-type situations. Neither alternative was considered by the Court.
VII.

Implications of Haig v. Agee

While the seven requirements of the domestic forum denial doctrine were generally adhered to in Rusk and Zemel, the Agee decision
indicates an end to the applicability of those requirements in the foreign setting. The doctrine, as set out in Cox, represents the culmination
of a slow, careful balancing between the rights of the individual and
the interests of the government. Zemel and Rusk showed the same
concern for balance while taking into account differences in particular
interests. Agee dealt with a unique person involved in extraordinary
circumstances. The fact that the Court did not find a way to limit its
holding to these facts may signal a new trend--one that is likely to offer
much less protection to those wishing to travel abroad in order to
speak.
The Secretary's actions in Agee would not have met with Court
approval had they involved denial of access to a domestic forum. In
fact, the holding supporting the revocation regulation is in some ways a
break with the spirit of previous foreign forum denial cases. More specifically, Agee grants the administrator of "licenses" for foreign forums
extensive discretion to determine when, and to whom, restrictions on
issuance of these licenses will apply.
The regulation upheld in Agee provides for denial whenever the
applicant is causing or is likely to cause "serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States." The implications of allowing the Secretary to determine the likelihood of damage
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have already been discussed.' 54 Possibly more significant, however, is
the danger of a loose interpretation of "serious damage to foreign

policy."
Brennan's dissent in Agee quotes from the transcript of oral argument. This portion of the dissent is particularly relevant to a discussion
of the Agee implications.
QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right now
were to apply for a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked
the purpose of his journey, to say, to denounce the United States
policy in Salvador in supporting the junta. And the Secretary of
State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose. Do
you think he can consistently do that in the light of our previous
cases?
[SOLICITOR GENERAL] McCREE: I would say, yes he can.
Because we have to vest these-The President of the United
States and the Secretary of State working under him are charged
with conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically155may be different from
that that we can exercise in this context.
of the Secretary's power of discreBrennan concludes that the extent
15 6
tion is "potentially staggering."
Could the Salvador hypothetical come true? Certainly the Secretary of State would have to consider the political ramifications of such
action before making his decision. But it seems that Agee would at
least provide him with a legal basis for a decision not to issue the passport. Criticism presupposes displeasure with the state of affairs on the
part of at least one citizen. Widespread dissension could hamper the
world-wide reputation and subsequent effectiveness of foreign policy
leaders. These possibilities might indeed be termed a "serious danger
to . . .foreign policy." The hypothetical would be consistent with a
modest reading of the State Department's regulation. Since the admissions of the intentions of the speaker give the Secretary an expectation
as to the nature of the speech, denial in this case apparently would also
be consistent with Agee's application of the Near exception.

Conclusion
In many of the forum denial cases, both domestic, and foreign, the
applicants for access represented unpopular and arguably dangerous
points of view. Yet the Court looked beyond the facts of each case and
framed its holdings with an eye toward future repercussions. Its primary concern was not to sustain an administrative judgment at all
154. See supra text accompanying note 151.
155. Agee, 453 U.S. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
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costs, but rather to apply the facts to a doctrine in a way that would
balance impartially the interests involved. It is unfortunate that the
Court has abandoned this tradition with Agee. The narrowness with
which the majority examined the issues caused it to overlook serious
implications of the holding on the future of foreign travel. It is unfortunate that the Court took this approach where alternatives were available which could have supported the Secretary's action while guarding
against future abuses of discretion.
The Court was faced with unique facts. It did not choose to distinguish the case from precedent on the basis of these facts, however.
Having with one stroke of the pen destroyed many of the protections
previously thought available to passport applicants, the Court erased
even more protections by refusing to establish any formal limits on the
discretion of the Secretary of State.
Many would argue that the Secretary of State should have the
power to curb criticism abroad. It may be true that unbridled criticism
lessens his effectiveness in the conduct of foreign policy. Justice
Goldberg said, in a different context: "If the exercise of. . .rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system. . . . then there is something very
wrong with that system."' 57 Free exercise of the right to speak might
not be compatible with the smooth operation of our system of conducting foreign policy. In the wake of.Agee, the courts will be forced to
decide which of these interests is more important to the health of the
nation.

157. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).

